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1.   Introduction 
 
 
 
The  U.S.  electric  power  system  consists  of  a  well  defined  set  of  basic 
components.  Electricity is “manufactured” in generating plants.  These generating plants 
are now typically located relatively far from where the electricity is consumed.  The high 
voltage transmission network both “transports” electricity from where it is produced to 
locations closer to where it is consumed and allows for the economical and reliable 
integration  of  dispersed  generating  facilities  connected  to  the  same  synchronized 
Alternating Current (AC) transmission network.   Electricity is then delivered to lower 
voltage sub-transmission transmission lines, and ultimately to even lower voltage local 
distribution networks where it is supplied to end-use consumers or “retail customers.” 
There  is  a  transmission  “system  operator”  for  each  “control  area”  or  “balancing 
authority”  with  responsibility  to  schedule  and  dispatch  generating  units  based  on 
economic and reliability criteria, to manage congestion on the network by re-dispatching 
generators “out of merit order” to meet transmission constraints, to maintain the physical 
parameters of the network, to coordinate with neighboring system operators, and in some 
cases to integrate these tasks with the management of a set of wholesale power markets. 
_________________________________ 
 
1 The views expressed here are my own and do not reflect the views of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 
MIT, Exelon Corporation, Transcanada Corporation, or any other organization with which I am affiliated. I 
am an outside director of Exelon Corporation and of Transcanada Corporation.  My other affiliations are 
identified at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/pjoskow/cv . A shorter version of this paper will appear in 
the Winter 2011 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
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 Prior to the late 1980s, the industry was composed primarily of vertically 
integrated utilities with geographic monopolies to serve retail consumers with “bundled” 
generation, transmission, distribution and metering services at prices regulated by state 
regulatory agencies.  These for-profit companies owned and operated the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity in their geographic areas and were responsible 
for operating the transmission facilities they owned as control area operators in 
cooperation with other control operators on one of the three synchronized AC grids in the 
country.  Federal regulation was and is the responsibility of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).  FERC’s regulatory authority extends to the terms and 
conditions of “unbundled” wholesale power sales and transmission service.  Since most 
of the industry was primarily vertically integrated until relatively recently, for decades, 
FERC’s authority was limited primarily to regulating sales of power and transmission 
service by vertically integrated utilities to unintegrated or partially integrated municipal 
and cooperative distribution utilities, which serve about 20% of the retail customers in the 
U.S.  In addition FERC regulated (“lightly”) short term sales of power between vertically 
integrated utilities (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983, 1986).  Despite the fact that electric 
power networks spanned many states, the bulk of regulation of the electric power 
industry was at the state and federal levels until the late 1990s.. 
 Since the late 1980s, FERC and several states embarked on restructuring and 
regulatory reform programs to promote competition in the supply of generation service 
both between and within states, to create wholesale power markets to replace centralized 
dispatch by vertically integrated utilities, to facilitate access of buyers and sellers of 
power to unbundled transmission service using facilities owned by third parties, to 
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reorganize and consolidate the operation of the high voltage network transmission 
networks to support efficient wholesale power markets and the management of scarce 
transmission capacity through the creation of Independent System Operators (ISOs) and 
larger Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), and to unbundle the provision of 
pure local distribution service from the supply of power to promote competition in the 
supply of unbundled electric power service (“retail competition”) to end-use consumers. 
 These reforms spread quickly during the late 1990s and were forecast to transform 
the entire electric power industry within a few years. Then came the fallout from the 
California Electricity Crisis (or the Western Electricity Crisis) of 2000-2001 (Joskow 
2001, Borenstein 2002) and the political reaction to it. It is fair to say that the California 
electricity crisis put a virtual halt on additional states adopting restructuring and 
associated wholesale and retail competitive reforms.  Some states that had adopted or 
planned to adopt these reforms reversed course (Joskow 2006).  FERC was unable to 
push through several major additional enhancements to its reform program; to create a 
“standard market design” for all wholesale markets, to expand the geographic expanse of 
RTOs to cover larger portions of the nation’s three physical electric power networks, and 
require all utilities with transmission facilities to join an RTO.   
 Today about half of the population of the country lives in states which adopted all 
or most of this reform agenda (Joskow 2006). The diffusion of retail competition to 
additional states has not occurred since 2001.  However, the reforms at the wholesale 
level have continued slowly to be enhanced by FERC. Competitive procurement and 
market contracting for new generating capacity has become much more common even in 
those states that have retained vertically integrated incumbent utilities under cost of 
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service regulation, and a large unregulated independent generating sector has continued 
to grow.  The number of customers taking advantage of retail competition opportunities 
continues to increase in those states where it is available. For a more detailed discussion 
of these reforms focused on promoting competition competition in wholesale and retail 
retail markets, I refer readers to my previous papers on this subject (Joskow 1989, 1997, 
2006). 
 While efforts to refine the wholesale and retail competitive market reforms 
initiated in the late 20th century continue, public policy interest has now shifted to 
modernizing and expanding transmission and distribution networks.  There are four 
primary areas of current public policy interest regarding these networks: (a) stimulating 
investment in new transmission capacity, especially “long distance” transmission 
facilities that span multiple states; (b) better integrating active electricity demand into 
wholesale power markets; (c) stimulating investment in technologies to improve the 
remote monitoring, two-way communication and automatic control of facilities on the 
transmission and distribution networks; and (d) to install “smart” metering and associated 
communications capabilities on customer premises to provide them with the opportunity 
to receive real time price and quantity information, to respond to these signals by 
adjusting appliance utilization internal to their homes and businesses and to make it 
possible for the utility or other third parties to contract with them to facilitate remote 
control of their appliances and equipment.  
 Collectively, the initiatives associated with the last two areas of public policy 
interest are what policymakers are referring to as “the smart grid.”  The opportunities and 
challenges associated with creating a smarter grid are the focus of this paper.  The other 
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two sets of issues are important and challenging, but space does not permit discussing 
them here. 
   A recent EPRI report (EPRI 2011) uses the following definition of the smart grid: 
“The term “Smart Grid” refers to the modernization of the electricity delivery system so 
that it monitors, protects, and automatically optimizes the operation of its interconnected 
elements – from the central and distributed generator to the high voltage transmission 
network and the distribution system, to industrial users and building automation systems, 
to energy storage installations, and to end-use consumers, and their thermostats, electric 
vehicles, appliances, and other household devices.” (EPRI, 2011a, page 1-1). 
 Current “smart grid” initiatives have been motivated primarily by efforts to 
respond to federal and state policies that promote generating technologies with no or low 
greenhouse gas emissions, to support the possible expansion of requirements to charge 
electric vehicle batteries at the distribution level, to encourage consumers to use 
electricity more efficiently in order to reduce the demand for electricity, and in this way 
to reduce the need for generation supplies, to reduce meter reading and other network 
operating costs, to facilitate wholesale and retail competition in the supply of power, and 
to accelerate replacement of an aging transmission and distribution infrastructure with 
modern technologies that improve network reliability and power quality at the 
distribution level. EPRI correctly points out that “The present electric power delivery 
infrastructure was not designed to meet the needs of a restructured electricity 
marketplace, or the increased use of renewable power production.” (EPRI, 2011a, page 1-
1).” 
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 The Obama administration has provided significant subsidies to stimulate utilities 
and states to adopt smart grid initiatives.  The Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 established the policy of the U.S. “to support the modernization of the nation’s 
electricity transmission and distribution system[s] to maintain a reliable and secure 
electricity infrastructure.”  The Act also sets out a variety of Federal goals and initiatives 
including undertaking smart grid research, development demonstration, investments, and 
consumer education and outreach programs and various supporting task forces.  
However, the 2007 Act provides only about $100 million per year of funds to support 
these initiatives.2 The American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided 
$4.5 billion of funds for smart grid demonstration and technology deployment projects, 
including various analyses of consumer behavior in response to the installation of “smart 
meters.”3  About 140 projects of been funded under these ARRA programs with about 
$5.5 billon of matching funds from utilities and their customers.  The 2009 ARRA also 
allocated about $400 million to ARPA-E (modeled after DARPA) for more traditional 
long term basic research and development projects, of which some relate to electricity.   
Several states have adopted similar policies on their own.4  The funds made available by 
the ARRA certainly increased interest and accelerated activity on smart grid projects 
around the country.  Those subsidies are now fully committed and are unlikely to be 
extended at anything close to the levels provided in the ARRA.   
 In what follows, I will examine the opportunities, challenges and uncertainties 
associated with investments in “smart grid” technologies at each of the traditional 
                                                 
2 http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/EISA_Title_XIII_Smart_Grid.pdf . 
3 http://www.smartgrid.gov/federal_initiatives  (June 10, 2011) 
4 California has been a leader in promoting smart grid initiatives.  
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/NEWS_RELEASE/119756.htm  (June 5, 2011) 
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components of the grid   Readers should be warned in advance that there is often more 
hope than evidence about both the cost and value of smart grid opportunities and that 
except in a few areas there exists relatively little serious economic analysis of costs and 
benefits.  The paper proceeds as follows.  I start with a discussion of some basic attributes 
of electricity supply, demand, pricing, and physical network attributes that are critical for 
understanding the opportunities and challenges associated expanding deployment of 
smart grid technologies.  I then discuss in turn issues associated with the deployment of 
these technologies at the high voltage transmission, local distribution, and end-use 
metering levels.  I will not discuss “behind the meter” technologies that may be installed 
inside of homes and businesses in response to the availability of smart grid capabilities, 
smart metering and variable pricing. 
 
2.  Important Attributes of Electricity 
    The demand for electricity varies widely from hour to hour, day to day and month 
to month.  Electricity demand is typically highest during the daytime hours and lowest at 
night.  It tends to be very high on unusually hot or unusually cold days and is lowest at 
night on mild spring and fall days.  Demand typically reaches its highest levels during 
only a few hours each year while there is a minimum “base” aggregate demand that is 
sustained through the entire year. Figure 1 displaces the levels of demand or “load” at 
different times of the day in New England on July 7, 2010. The peak demand is 60% 
higher than the lowest demand on that day. 
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Figure 1 
Real Time Demand, July 7, 2010 
Source: Constructed from Data from the New England ISO (http://www.iso-
ne.com) 
 
 
 
 One of the important “special” characteristics of electricity is that it cannot be 
stored economically for most uses with current technologies (except in special 
applications where batteries, pumped storage, compressed air, etc. are potentially 
economically attractive).  This means that unlike typical manufactured products, physical 
inventories are not generally available to balance supply and demand in real time and 
“stockouts” are equivalent to rolling blackouts or a larger uncontrolled system collapse 
(Joskow and Tirole 2007).  This is the case because supply and demand must be balanced 
continuously in order to maintain a variety of physical network criteria within narrow 
bounds (e.g. frequency, voltage, capacity constraints) in order to keep the system from 
collapsing.   Electricity “moves” at the speed of light and is the ultimate “just in time” 
manufacturing process where supply must be produced to meet demand in real time.   
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 The variability of electricity demand, the non-storability of electricity, the need to 
balance supply and demand continuously to maintain the physical parameters of the 
system also have important implications for the nature of traditional economic 
investments on the generation side of the system.  Electric generating systems typically 
consist of the mix of “base load,” “intermediate load,” and “peaking” capacity to meet 
variable demands at least cost. Base load capacity has relatively high capital costs and 
low marginal operating costs, intermediate capacity has lower capital costs and higher 
marginal operating costs, and peaking capital. has even lower capital costs and higher 
marginal operating costs (Turvey (1968), Boiteux (1964a), Joskow and Tirole (2007).  
Because it has low marginal operating costs, base load capacity is used throughout the 
year to meet the minimum “base load” demand during most hours.  During hours when 
demand rises to higher levels, the system operator (or the market) will call on additional 
intermediate capacity with higher marginal operating costs to meet these higher demand 
levels, and when demand is very high, as on hot summer days, the highest marginal 
operating cost capacity is called as well to meet demand.  This type of supply program to 
balance supply and demand efficiently can be mediated through a traditional centralized 
economic dispatch process, where generators are ordered from lowest to highest marginal 
cost and the system operator marches up the marginal dispatch cost curve to dispatch 
supply sufficient to meet demand.  It can and now often is mediated through competitive 
wholesale market mechanisms where the system operator (to oversimplify) constructs a 
dispatch curve from the bids to offer supplies submitted by competing generators and the 
system operator accepts supply offers and determines market clearing prices subject to a 
variety of transmission network constraints..   
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 It should be emphasized that the generators in typical models of electricity system 
operations and investment are “dispatchable.”  That means that when the dispatch curve 
is constructed the system operator is assumed to be able to call on the generators to 
supply electricity when it is economical to run them based on their relative *short run 
marginal operating costs to meet demand.  Dispatchable generators also provide other 
services to keep the network operating within necessary physical parameters and to 
maintain reliability.   
 These considerations also have implications for the spot price of electricity in an 
unregulated wholesale electricity market and the shadow price of electricity in a 
traditional regulated environment that relies on an economic dispatch curve based on 
estimates of marginal generating costs.  Prices and associated marginal costs (or marginal 
bid prices that clear the wholesale market) will vary widely over time to balance supply 
and widely variable levels of demand and generators with different marginal operating 
costs must be relied upon to clear the market as demand varies.  Prices (marginal costs) 
are generally high when demand is high and low when demand is low reflecting the 
marginal cost of the generation supplied needed to meet demand at different points in 
time.   
 During unusually high demand periods supply and demand may (theoretically) be 
rationed on the demand side with market clearing prices reflecting the opportunity cost to 
consumers of consuming a little more or a little less.  When unexpected outages occur 
due to generation supply constraints or network failures, electricity consumers bear costs 
typically measured as the Value of Lost Load or VOLL (Stoft, Joskow and Tirole 
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(2007)).  For an optimal system this means that there will be a few hours when the 
competitive spot price of electricity will be (or should be) very high (Joskow 2005). 
 Figure 2 displays the variations in wholesale spot prices in New England during 
the same hot day in July 2010 as Figure #1.  The highest price is five times the lowest 
price on that day.  More extreme variability has been observed under more extreme 
weather conditions, though there is a $1000 cap placed on spot prices for energy in most 
RTO/ISO areas ($3000 in Texas), a number that is generally thought to be well below the 
VOLL in most +circumstances and raises other issues for efficient short run and long run 
performance of competitive wholesale markets (Joskow 2005). 
 
                               
 
Figure 2 
Real-Time Energy Prices (July 7, 2010) 
Source: Constructed from New England ISO (http://www.ne-iso.com ) 
 
 The prices in Figure 2 are wholesale spot prices.  However, these are not the 
prices that retail consumers, especially residential and small commercial consumers, 
typically see. Most small residential and commercial consumers are charged a price per 
kWh they consumed that does not vary with the time they consumed the power or reflect 
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the associated variations in wholesale prices. This has been the case because traditional 
residential and small commercial have meters that record only aggregate consumption 
between monthly or semi-monthly readings.5  In some states, residential and small 
commercial consumers can opt for time of use meters which charge different pre-set 
prices during large pre-determined “peak” and “off-peak” periods. While these TOU 
retail prices somewhat more accurately reflect variations in wholesale market prices, the 
relationship is necessarily very rough indeed since they reflect only the average price 
during, say, summer daytime hours, but not the very high wholesale prices seen on only a 
few summer days.   
 Electricity generated in the U.S. (and most of Canada except Quebec) is 
physically supplied over three synchronized AC networks:  The Eastern Interconnection, 
the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).  
There are small mostly Direct Current (DC) interconnections between them, but for all 
intents and purposes they are physically separated from one another.  However, the 
institutional organization of the electric power industry does not match this physical 
reality.   At one point in the 1960s there were at least 150 separate control area operators 
(now called balancing authorities), primarily vertically integrated utilities, with control 
responsibilities for portions of each of the three interconnected high voltage networks. To 
facilitate coordination between transmission operators controlling portions of the same 
physical network they first organized themselves into voluntary regional reliability 
councils to establish voluntary rules for operating facilities connected to the larger 
                                                 
5In a few cases, the largest retail consumers were billed based on prices that did vary more or less with 
variations in wholesale market prices. (Mitchell, Manning and Acton (1979), pp. 9-16).   
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physical networks.6  These regional reliability entities were in turn loosely coordinated  
under another voluntary organization called the North American Electric Power 
Coordinating Council (NERC).  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized FERC to 
create a formal Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to establish mandatory reliability 
standards to be approved by FERC and to be applied to all transmission operators as 
determined for the ERO. NERC was ultimately selected by FERC to be the national ERO 
in 2006 and the first mandatory standards were adopted in 2007. NERC works closely 
with the regional reliability organization to establish and monitor network reliability. 
NERC has no economic regulatory functions, however, though it can report violations to 
FERC which can assess financial penalties if appropriate.7    
 FERC initiatives begun during the 1990s promoted the creation of Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Independent System Operators (ISO) with larger 
spans of control over the high voltage transmission network. This has led to a smaller 
number of control areas and balancing authorities and has moved the management of the 
high voltage transmission network to more closely match its physical attributes.  
However, a large number of entities still own and/or control portions of the U.S. high 
voltage transmission network (by comparison England and Wales has a single entity that 
owns and operate the high voltage transmission network as does France.  Germany has 
two major network operators.)  
3. Enhancing High Voltage Transmission Systems 
 High voltage transmission networks are central to the economical and reliable 
operation of a modern electric power system. It is important to recognize that high 
                                                 
6 http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact_sheets/transmission.html , June 1, 2011 
7 http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|7 , June 1, 2011 
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voltage AC networks are not switched networks (like a traditional railroad or telephone 
network) in the sense that power generated at point A does not flow to a specific 
customer located at point B.  Electricity flows on an AC power network according to 
physical laws known as Kirchoff’s laws and Ohm’s law (Clayton (2001), Stoft (2002), 
Hogan (1992), Joskow and Tirole (2000)).  To drastically oversimplify, electricity 
produced on an AC electric power network distributes itself to follow the paths of least 
resistance.  Adding a new generator or transmission line to a network can affect power 
flows everywhere on the network.  Indeed, it could be the case that nothing would flow 
over a specific new transmission line if it is not designed carefully to take account of its 
impact on the entire network.  And a new generator may not be able to supply electricity 
to the network if there is congestion on the transmission lines connecting it to the larger 
transmission grid.   
 Transmission networks are also operated to maintain a variety of physical 
parameters (e.g. frequency, voltage, stability) and to manage network congestion to 
maintain reliability. The application of these reliability criteria can place significant 
constraints on the power flows from and to particular locations on the network and are 
managed by system operators by adjusting generator output and maintaining various 
generators in operating reserve status.  Network congestion is also reflected in differences 
in wholesale market prices for electricity (or shadow prices where wholesale markets 
with locational pricing have not been created) at different locations on the network 
(Hogan (1992), Joskow and Tirole (2000)).  Most of the wholesale power markets 
operated by RTOs and ISOs have adopted market designs that integrate wholesale market 
price formation (locational marginal prices or LMP) with congestion management and 
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other grid reliability requirements (Joskow 2006) by adopting “security constrained least-
cost dispatch” mechanisms to balance supply and demand and to determine market 
clearing prices at each location. 
 3.1. Smart grid Investments to reduce congestion and increase transmission 
network reliability.  There is significant congestion on each of the three AC networks 
covering the continental United States during certain hours of the year, including many 
“off-peak” hours, although as far I know the costs of congestion have never been 
quantified systematically for the entire country.8  A natural approach to measuring the 
magnitude and costs of congestion is to make use of difference in locational wholesale 
prices over time.  For example, Table 1 displays the average spot wholesale prices during 
peak hours at different locations on the Eastern Interconnection on a hot day in 2010. 
These differences are too large to be accounting for by standard high voltage 
transmission line losses which are on the order of 2% at the high voltage level (total line 
losses including distribution losses average about 6.5%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 These costs, or at least the congestion rents,  are quantified for the RTO/ISOs, that have markets based on 
a locational marginal price market design (LMP).  For example, in the PJM RTO region congestion costs 
were estimated at about $2 billion per year by the independent market monitor in his State of the Market 
Report for 2006.  PJM, State of the Market Report 2006, April 2007. 
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Table 1 
Day-ahead Peak Period Prices for Delivery July, 7, 2010 
 
Location   $/MWh 
 
Boston (Mass Hub)  117.75 
 
New York City (Zone J) 138.50 
 
Buffalo (Zone A)    79.00 
 
Virginia (Dominion Hub) 107.75 
 
Chicago (Illinois hub)    68.75 
 
Minneapolis (Minn Hub)   42.50 
 
Florida      37.00 
 
Source: Megawatt Daily, July 7, 2010, page 2 
 
 It should be clear that on July 7, 2010, power was not flowing from one location 
to another on the Eastern Interconnection to arbitrage away large differences in (day-
ahead) wholesale spot prices.  This was an extreme day since hot weather caused demand 
in the Northeast to be quite high.  At the same time, there was ample generating capacity 
available at other locations on the Eastern Interconnection comfortably to balance supply 
and demand in the aggregate on the Eastern Interconnection.  The price differences 
emerged because transmission congestion was keeping more power from flowing from 
West to East, from New England and upstate New York into New York City, and from 
South to North on the Eastern Interconnection.   
 There are three primary reasons for the existence of this congestion.  First, to 
move power from the North, West, and South to New York City requires transactions 
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with multiple RTO/ISOs, and balancing authorities with different market designs, 
settlement rules, and transmission service prices.  This creates transactions costs that limit 
flows of power to take full advantage of price arbitrage opportunities.  Second, system 
operators operate their own individual pieces of the larger physical network 
“conservatively,” placing a very high value on reliability.  They operate them 
conservatively for a number of reasons.  Since they can “see” the state of their own high 
voltage network in more real time detail than the attributes of neighboring networks, they 
maintain (undefined) “contingency” margins to be prepared for unanticipated events in 
neighboring areas that may have significant effects on power flows in their control or 
balancing area. The 2003 Northeast Blackout resulted in part due to poor 
communications between system operators of interconnected control areas.  In addition, 
their ability quickly to monitor and control the status and operation of their own network 
is limited by the extent of the deployment of automatic monitoring, communication and 
control equipment on the high voltage network and their ability to model the effects of 
changing generation, demand, and imports/exports on key network parameters.   
 In almost all cases, the binding constraints on transmission flows are “reliability” 
constraints that are built into transmission network operating procedures.  These 
reliability constraints in turn are based on hard-to-reproduce engineering reliability 
criteria and depend in practice in part on the system operator’s ability to monitor and 
control the network in real time and reflect the balkanized control of the larger physical 
networks. No transmission system operates at full capacity as that term is normally 
understood.  They all are operated with “contingency reserves” to accommodate 
unanticipated network or generator failures that must be picked up by this reserve 
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capacity instantly to maintain reliability.  Better remote monitoring, communication and 
automatic control equipment placed on transmission lines and substations can make it 
possible to reduce the “contingency margin” required by system operators to meet their 
reliability criteria, effectively increasing transmission capacity, without actually building 
new transmission capacity and without reducing the very high level of reliability at the 
high voltage transmission level.   
 Despite this complex operational management structure, the U.S. transmission 
system is presently very reliable.  While good comprehensive numbers are not available, 
it is extremely rare that retail consumers lose power because of failures of equipment or 
operating errors on the high voltage transmission system.  EPRI (2011a, p.2.1) estimates 
that U.S. power systems achieve 99.999% reliability at the high voltage (bulk) 
transmission network level and that over 90% of the outages experienced by retail 
customers are due to failures on the distribution system, not the transmission system 
(EPRI (2011a, p. 6.1). However, when a rare major failure does occur on the high voltage 
transmission network, as with the 2003 Midwest-Northeast blackout when 50 million 
customers were affected with outages that lasted up to a couple of days, the associated 
costs can be quite high.    
 I believe that it is widely accepted that there has been underinvestment in 
monitoring, communications and control equipment on the high voltage transmission 
network. EPRI (2011a, Chapter 5; see also New York ISO 
 http://www.nyiso.com/public/energy_future/issues_trends/smart_grid/index.jsp)    
and U.S. Department of Energy  (http://www.oe.energy.gov/ ) discusses the kinds of 
monitoring, communications, and control enhancement available to improve the 
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performance and the effective capacity of high voltage transmission networks.  EPRI 
(2011a) recognizes that it is hard to estimate the costs of upgrading the high voltage 
transmission system with this “smart” equipment, but estimates that the total investment 
cost is $56-$64 billion (EPRI 2011a, p. 5.1), though later in the report they give a number 
of $82-$90 billion.  EPRI also concludes the investments in improved monitoring of high 
voltage transmission networks represent the most cost-effective category of smart grid 
investments. Investments in this category also represent about 20% of the total cost of 
EPRI’s defined Smart Grid program.  This is consistent with my own assessment.  
Accordingly, given the under investment in smart grid technology at the high voltage 
transmission level it is unfortunate that only a small fraction of the smart grid funds 
drawn from the ARRA have been allocated to high voltage transmission enhancements, 
since this appears to me to be an area where there is likely to be a high rate of return.9  
  These smart grid investments at the high voltage transmission level are likely to 
have even higher returns as “intermittent” generating capacity, primarily wind and grid-
based solar, grows in response to subsidies and mandates.  As previously noted, most 
conventional generating technologies (e.g. coal, gas-combined-cycle, nuclear) are 
“dispatchable.”  This means that the generators can be controlled by the system operator 
and can be turned on and off based primarily on their economic attractiveness at every 
point in time both to supply electricity and to supply network reliability services (e.g. 
frequency regulation, spinning reserves). Wind, solar and some other renewable 
generating technologies supply electricity “intermittently” and are not dispatchable in the 
traditional sense.  Electricity produced by these technologies is driven by wind speed, 
                                                 
9 http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/tracking_deployment ,  and   
http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/tracking_deployment/investments ,  May 30, 2011 
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wind direction, cloud cover, haze, and other weather characteristics. As a result, they 
typically cannot be controlled or economically dispatched by system operators based on 
economic criteria in the same way as dispatchable technologies.  
 The output of intermittent generating units can vary widely from day to day, hour 
to hour or minute to minute, and location to location depending on the technology and 
variations in attributes of the renewable resource that drives the turbine generating 
electricity. This can create significant challenges for operating the high voltage 
transmission grid reliably and increase the costs of doing so. Rather than controlling how 
much and when an intermittent generator is dispatched, system operators must respond to 
what comes at them by calling on dispatchable generators to balance supply and demand 
continuously. 
 These network issues associated with intermittent generating capacity are 
different from issues related to the proper comparative valuation of intermittent and 
dispatchable generating technologies (Joskow 2011a, 2011b); Borenstein (2008) applies 
compatible methods to derive the (high) cost per ton of CO2 displaced associated with 
California’s rooftop solar energy subsidy program).  There has by now been a great deal 
of discussion and analysis of the technical challenges that must be confronted effectively 
to integrate large quantities of intermittent renewable energy technologies --- wind and 
solar in particular --- into electric power networks (e.g. NERC, ERCOT, New England 
ISO, NYISO, Mount et. al., Gowrisankaran, Reynolds, and Samano).  In a number of 
cases the technical analyses have been accompanied by estimates of the additional costs 
of integrating large quantities of one or more intermittent generating technologies into 
electric power networks consistent with meeting reliability criteria (e.g. USDOE (pp. 62-
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67), ERCOT, NYISO).10   As I read the analysis that has been done to date, it is clear that 
accommodating large quantities of intermittent generation will require adjustments in 
operating practices and require holding (and building) more generation for network 
support services to accommodate large swings in intermittent generation and for backup.  
This will (further) increase the costs of grid-based wind and solar generation. Smart 
grid investments on the high voltage transmission network that improve remote 
monitoring, communications, and automatic switching and control capabilities can make 
it easier for the network operator to respond to rapid swings in power flows from 
intermittent generators and potentially reduce the costs of their wide diffusion on to the 
network. 
 Finally, there are physical limits on the ability to transmit power over specific 
transmission interfaces due to physical transmission capacity constraints.  These 
constraints can only be relieved by building more transmission capacity. However, 
building major new transmission lines is extremely difficult and the problems here are 
primarily institutional and not technological.   While this is not a “smart grid” issue per 
see it is an important transmission grid issue as it affects the realization of other public 
policy goals, in particular development of renewable resources in remote locations where 
the attributes of the wind and the sun reduce the costs and/or increase the value of 
renewable energy. While the issues associated with building new transmission lines are 
beyond the scope of this paper, a few comments are in order because they have broader 
                                                 
10 The studies are of varying quality and comprehensiveness and the estimated integration costs for wind 
vary by roughly a factor of 5.  However, the short run integration costs are typically less than $10/MWh, 
though the costs of additional transmission capacity, and price increases needed to maintain the profitability 
of existing conventional generation and investment in new conventional generation needed to balance 
supply and demand consistent with reliability criteria are typically excluded from the analysis. 
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implications for smart grid investments and the realization of a variety of policy 
initiatives affecting the electric power industry. 
 Legacy transmission network configurations and the complex organizational and 
regulatory structure of the U.S. electric power industry create significant barriers to 
building transmission facilities between control areas and over long distances that require 
transiting multiple control areas and states.  The U.S. transmission system was not built 
to facilitate large movements between interconnected control areas or over long 
distances.  Rather it was built to balance supply and demand reliably within individual 
utility (or holding company) service areas and to move power from jointly owned 
generating facilities back to the owners’ service areas.  Interconnections between control 
areas were built primarily for reliability reasons and to accommodate modest exchanges 
of short-term economy energy.  While the capacity of interconnections have expanded 
over time, the bulk of the price differences in Table 1 are due to the fact that there is 
insufficient transmission capacity to move large amounts of power from, for example, 
Chicago to New York City. 
 The regulatory process that determines how high voltage transmission capacity 
(and smart grid investments in the transmission network) is paid for and the division of 
regulatory responsibility between the state commissions and FERC is too complex and 
byzantine to review here (see Joskow 2005). However, these regulatory rules are 
significant barriers to efficient transmission investment.  FERC has been trying to resolve 
the issue of “who pays” and “how much” for new transmission lines for years.  FERC 
Order 1000 issued in July 2011 attempts again to establish new cost allocation principles, 
to encourage regional planning, and to encourage independent merchant transmission 
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investments.  Order 1000 has many constructive features, but it is controversial and I 
expect that it will take several years for it to be fully implemented. 
 Cost allocation and pricing of transmission investments is not the only barrier to 
investment in new transmission facilities. Transmission line siting authority lies with the 
states rather than with FERC.  A transmission line developer must get permits to build the 
line in each state in which its transmission facilities are located. It turns out that a large 
fraction of the population does not want a transmission line built in their backyards, 
especially if they are not likely to benefit from the new line.  The NIMBY problem is 
acute for new transmission facilities, especially when they are located in states that do not 
see great benefits from these facilities.  Moreover, states where low-cost generators are 
located, which in turn cannot export power due to transmission constraints, benefit from 
this power being “locked-in” to their regions because this keeps wholesale prices lower 
than they would be if there were not export constraints (Joskow and Tirole, 2000).  
 While FERC was given certain backup siting authority in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 when state commissions refused to approve new interstate transmission lines in 
DOE designated National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors, the application of this 
authority has been seriously undermined by decisions by two federal appeals courts11.  
The best solution to the siting problems would be to adopt the approach reflected in the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938.  That is, transfer transmission ultimate siting authority to 
FERC.  I would suggest enhancing this authority further also giving FERC regional 
transmission planning authority.  The political barriers to making these changes are 
enormous, however.  I am not optimistic that these issues will be resolved soon and 
                                                 
11 http://www.energylegalblog.com/archives/2011/02/08/3483 , JUne 11, 2011 
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underinvestment in transmission facilities is likely to continue to be a problem for many 
years.    
4. Automating Local Distribution Networks 
 Most legacy local distribution networks have relatively little remote monitoring of 
loads, voltage, transients and outages, and relatively little automation of switches, 
breakers, small substations etc. In this sense they are not “smart.” The interest in 
automating local distribution networks is related primarily to opportunities to reduce 
operation and maintenance costs (goodbye meter readers, manual disconnects, responses 
to non-existent network outages), to improve reliability and responses to outages, to 
improving power quality, to efficiently integrating distributed renewable energy sources, 
especially solar PV, to accommodate demands for recharging of the electric vehicle of the 
future, to deploy “smart meters” that can measure customers real-time consumption, to 
allow for dynamic pricing that reflects wholesale prices, to facilitate the integration of 
new and potential future customer load control devices, and to expand the range of 
products that competing retail suppliers can offer to customers in those states that have 
adopted retail competition models.  
 The technologies being deployed on local distribution systems include enhanced 
remote monitoring and data acquisition of feeder loads, voltage and disturbances, 
automatic switches and breakers, enhanced communications with “smart” distribution 
substations and transformers, and supporting communications and IT systems. The DOE 
has supported about 70 projects in this area with ARRA grant funds on a roughly 50/50 
cost sharing basis. 
 (http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/tracking_deployment/distribution ) 
25 
 
 This transformation of local distribution systems is feasible, though it will take 
many years and a lot of capital investment.  The question is whether the benefits exceed 
the costs. Convincing cost-benefit analysis is hard to come by.  EPRI (2011a) estimates 
that deployment (it appears to about 55% of distribution feeders) would cost between 
$120 - $170 billion, recognizing that it’s hard to estimate the costs.  EPRI (2011a) claims 
that the benefits far exceed the costs.  Unfortunately, this is the only comprehensive effort 
at the cost-benefit analysis that is publicly available and I found the benefit analyses to be 
speculative and impossible to reproduce given the information made available in EPRI’s 
report. Nearly half of the overall benefits ($445 billion NPV) for EPRI’s entire smart grid 
program are attributed to “reliability,” which appears to be shorthand for reliability and 
power quality.  There is another benefit category called “security,” ($151 billion NPV) 
which seems to be a subset of “reliability.”  Assuming it is, that gives us an estimate of 
about $600 billion of NPV reliability benefits from the smart grid program. 
 According to EPRI (2011a, page 6.1) over 90% of the electricity supply outages 
experienced by retail electricity consumers occur because of failures on the local 
distribution network.  These failures may be caused by wind and storms, tree limbs 
falling on overhead distribution lines, icing up of distribution equipment, overloads of the 
local distribution network, failures of low-voltage transformers and breakers due to age 
or poor maintenance, cars that crash into poles and knock down distribution equipment, 
flooding of underground distribution, excessive heat, natural aging, etc.  No matter how 
smart we make local distribution systems there will be a significant fraction of outages 
arising from natural causes, especially in areas that rely on overhead, rather than 
underground, distribution lines.  To put this in perspective, using standard (IEEE) 
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measurement criteria (which exclude certain planned and weather-related outages) the 
average residential household has about 1.5 unplanned outages per year with an average 
outage duration of about 100 minutes per year (I am rounding to simplify the 
calculation).12  Accordingly, the average residential customer experiences about 150 
minutes of unexpected outages per year or 10.5% of one day per year.  I find it very 
difficult to rationalize EPRI’s benefit estimates with typical estimates of VOLL (e.g. 
$5,000 to $30,000/MWh lost).  Indeed they appear to be an order of magnitude too high.  
 As the world becomes more “digital,” aspects of power quality, in particular very 
short voltage drops and electrical transient that appear almost as flickers of lights, 
potentially create significant problems for digital equipment of various kinds.  However, 
how we respond to the power quality issue raises the question of whether distribution grid 
investments that increase everyone’s power quality are more efficient than behind the 
meter investments made by those who value power quality highly, as is often now the 
case for server farms, customer service operations and data bases for financial service 
companies, etc. The value of power quality may be very high for customers which have 
very sensitive equipment they rely on and quite low for the rest of us.  For those 
customers who place a high value on power quality it may be much cheaper overall to 
install equipment on the customer’s premises, as is now the case, rather than making 
large investments to improve power quality for everyone.  This issue would benefit from 
more independent empirical evidence and analysis. 
 Of more pressing concern are the new demands that may be placed on at least 
some distribution systems by distributed generation, primarily rooftop photovoltaic (PV) 
systems, , and by the need to recharge plug-in electric vehicle batteries.  Several states are 
                                                 
12 Power Engineering Society (2006) 
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heavily promoting solar PV technology, with large subsidies (Borenstein 2008). Due to 
the intermittency of the output of these technologies (NERC (2009), pp. 27-29) they will 
place new stresses on local distribution feeders where they are installed, and create large 
and potentially rapid variations in the net demand on distribution feeders, where net 
demand can be negative when PV supply exceeds the customer’s demand. Legacy 
distribution networks where not designed to accommodate raid changes in demand or to 
receive rather than just deliver power to end-use consumers.  Better remote real time 
monitoring and remote and automatic control capabilities, data acquisition, more rapid 
analysis of the state of distribution networks and appropriate responses, and automatic 
breakers and switches will be required to accommodate significant quantities of these 
resources safely and efficiently.   
 Of course, there will be a wide variation in the penetration of distributed solar 
generation across locations depending on state subsidy policies, variations in basic 
insolation resources, local distribution pricing policies, and consumer preferences. PV 
diffusion will vary widely from feeder to feeder even within states that promote 
distributed generation and electric vehicles aggressively. This suggests a targeted 
approach to distribution system automation that upgrades distribution automation in a 
way that gives more weight to feeders where distributed generation penetration, 
associated swings in demand on the distribution system and expected stress on specific 
sets of distribution feeders will come sooner and be more important.  
 The potential future demands placed on the distribution system by electric 
vehicles (including plug-in hybrids) raise similar issues.  In 2010 there were at most 
3,000 plug-in electric vehicles sold in the U.S. and about 275,000 hybrids out of 11.6 
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million total car sales.  The future of plug-in vehicles and which battery technologies 
(and associated recharging demand) is very uncertain.  Forecasts of the fraction of new 
vehicles that will be electric plug-ins by 2035 varies from less than 10% to over 80%. 
EIA (AEO, 2011, p.72, EPRI 2011b, Chapter 4) forecasts a light duty vehicles (LDV) 
market share of only 5% for plug-in and all-electric electric vehicles in 2035 in its  
reference case.  The National Research Council (2010, page 2)  concludes that a realistic 
estimate is that by 2030 about 4.5% of the national light duty vehicle fleet will be plug-in 
electrics and a maximum possibility of about 13%. The future path of electric vehicle 
sales depends on the price of gasoline, subsidies for electric vehicles, technological 
change affecting battery life and costs, new CAFE standards, reductions in electric 
vehicle costs, and consumer behavior.  The vehicle stock also turns over fairly slowly so 
that even with higher estimates of annual sales, there will be time to adapt to better 
information about sales and recharging requirements on the distribution system.  
 Clearly, there is a lot of uncertainty about the future penetration of electric 
vehicles (all-electric and plug-in hybrids).  Moreover, the load placed on the distribution 
system will depend on the batteries and charge-up time selected by vehicle owners.  
Shorter charging times at higher voltages (e.g. 240 Kv) can place very significant loads 
on local distribution networks even with modest electric vehicle penetration.  This raises 
some unique pricing issues.  If electric vehicles recharge at night, the price and marginal 
cost of wholesale power determined in regional markets will continue to be low over the 
next couple of decades since the increase in aggregate electricity demand at the regional 
wholesale power level is likely to be modest.  Again, full implementation of real time 
pricing would provide incentives for owners of electric vehicles to charge at night when 
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power prices are lower.  However, the demand on portions of the local distribution 
system in areas where electric vehicle sales may be concentrated (e.g. Berkeley, 
Westwood, Cambridge, MA) could peak at night when energy prices in the much broader 
wholesale power market are low. That is, the effective cost of using the distribution 
system may be quite high at night even though wholesale power prices are low if electric 
vehicle owners are concentrated on selected distribution feeders and choose to recharge at 
240kv in four hours rather than at 120Kv for 8 hours (Browermaster 2011). This suggests 
that more thought should be given to the pricing of distribution service which continues 
to be based on flat rates that do not vary with demand on the local distribution system or 
the incremental and decremental costs of distribution service.   
 The uncertainty and geographic diversity of the impacts of the growing 
penetration of distributed generation and electric vehicles suggests that it makes sense to 
take some time to roll out those aspects of the local distribution automation and capacity 
expansion programs designed to accommodate distributed generation and electric 
vehicles and to target it at local distribution networks where distributed generation and 
electric vehicles are penetrating most quickly.  It also suggests that more thought needs to 
be given to pricing distribution service separately from wholesale power (e.g. with a 
demand charge based on individual customers’ peak load on the distribution system).   
 I offer one caveat to my conclusion about the timing of the deployment of local 
distribution system automation technologies.  Many U.S. distribution systems are aging 
and utilities are embarking on large distribution network replacement programs.  These 
are long-lived investments, and it makes sense for these programs to take advantage of 
the most economical modern distribution technologies, and this will often mean 
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deploying much more automation and communication technologies even if deployment 
of distributed generation and electric vehicles is expected to be slow. 
5. Smart Meters and Dynamic Pricing Incentives 
   It is not unusual for the incremental generating capacity needed to meet the peak 
demand during the 100 highest demand hours each year (1.1% of the hours) accounts for 
10% to 15% of the generating capacity on a system.  Accordingly, cutting peak demand 
during a small number of hours and more generally “flattening out” the system load 
duration curve can reduce generating costs significantly in the long run. Retail prices that 
are not tied to variations in wholesale prices inefficiently increase the level of peak 
demand by underpricing it and may discourage increased demand during off-peak hours 
by overpricing it. 
 The idea of moving from time invariant electricity prices to “peak-load” pricing 
where prices are more closely tied to variations in marginal cost has been around since at 
least fifty years (Boiteux (1964b,c) Turvey (1968), Steiner (1956), Kahn, 1970, pp. 63-
123).  However, there has been a long lag between the development of the basic theory of 
peak load, variable load, or marginal cost pricing for electricity, and its application in 
practice, especially in the U.S. (Mitchel, Manning and Acton 1978 discuss developments 
in other countries). There is evidence from the well designed TOU experiments in the 
1970s that consumers do respond more or less as expected to price incentives (Aigner 
1985).   However, a 2008 FERC survey indicated that only about 1% of residential 
customers were on TOU rates (FERC 2010, p. 27), mostly in the West (probably in 
California).   
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 “Smart meters” record real time consumption and have two-way communications 
capabilities (AMI) and have many more capabilities than traditional TOU meters.  They 
send real time consumption data to the utility and make feasible various forms of real 
time pricing that tie retail prices to dynamic wholesale prices. Smart meters and 
associated communications and data acquisition and processing capabilities also allow 
the utility, the consumer or third parties to send signals back to the customer’s home or 
business to respond to price signals by controlling energy use (e.g. turning the air 
conditioning down) and can reduce peak demands when retail prices would now be high.  
From my perspective smart meters and some form of variable pricing that ties retail 
prices more closely to wholesale prices go together, though some utilities are installing 
smart meters without also introducing variable pricing options. 
 The historical arguments for not introducing real time or dynamic pricing were 
that (a) the meters would be too costly for residential and small commercial customers 
given the potential for reducing dead weight loses, (b) retail consumers would not 
understand or effectively utilize complex rate designs, (c) meter reading a billing costs 
would increase with more complex rates, and (d) changing rate designs would lead to 
large redistributions of income reflecting the wide variations in consumption patterns 
across individuals and the decades old mechanisms for allocating costs among types of 
customers and within customer classes (Borenstein 2007a, 2007b).  As a result, relatively 
little progress was made on implementing variable pricing and load control options for 
residential and small commercial customers until recently in the U.S.  
  At least some of these arguments are increasingly being questioned and empirical 
analysis of various kinds, including results from experimental pilot programs, are being 
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used to support innovative changes.  Metering technology has moved forward very 
significantly.  The capabilities of modern smart meters go well beyond the simple remote 
meter reading technologies with one-way communications capabilities (AMR) that many 
utilities have installed to reduce meter reading costs and the need for estimated bills when 
the meter could not be accessed and read. The costs of more advanced meters which have 
two-way communications capabilities (AMI), can record consumption at least once each 
hour, can be turned on and off remotely, can match hourly consumption with customers, 
and can control the utilization of appliances remotely  have declined and communications 
options have increased and costs decreased over time.  Smart meters (AMI) have become 
a technically and potentially economically attractive technological option that can 
significantly reduce meter reading costs, provide two-way communications capabilities 
and a wide range of other functionalities that can facilitate the active demand-side 
management, support dynamic retail prices that are closely tied to dynamic wholesale 
market prices, enhance information about demands and outages on the distribution grid, 
create synergies between “smart meters” and grid investments with real time 
communications and control capabilities, and implement some form of real time pricing. 
(Borenstein 2005, Borenstein and Holland 2005, Faruqui and Wood 2011, Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2010, 2011, Faruqui 2011a). 
 Nevertheless,  relatively few “smart meters” had been installed and used with 
some type of dynamic pricing in the U.S.13  A large fraction of the matching funds 
awarded by the DOE’s from its ARRA smart grid subsidy program are for “smart meters” 
                                                 
13 These meters must be distinguished from meters that could be read remotely, typically on a monthly or 
semi-monthly basis, with one way communications to allow the utility to conserve on the costs of human 
meter readers (AMR). EIA reports that in 2008 about 32% of retail consumers had some type of advanced 
meter, but 90% were AMR meters.  The fraction of customers with advanced meters is now growing 
rapidly and the AMI share is increasing. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=510. 
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(AMI), supporting IT and billing software, communications capabilities, and other 
distribution network enhancements to take advantage of  smart meter capabilities 
(http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/overview, June 1, 2011) .  And a few states have 
mandated that distribution utilities deploy such smart meters for all customers over a 
period of years.  It is estimated that about 5 million smart meters have now been installed 
at residential and small commercial locations in response to federal and state policy 
initiatives. [reference] 
 There are two sides to the analysis of the costs and benefits of large scale 
deployment of smart meters.  On the demand side one needs to be able to measure the 
demand elasticities and cross-elasticities for a very diverse population of consumers who 
have different appliance stocks, live in homes of widely varying sizes, experience wide 
differences in weather conditions, have different appliance mixes, different incomes, and 
different levels and structure of incumbent electricity tariffs, and consumer a wide range 
of KWh of electricity each month.  This is more complicated than the standard demand 
estimation problem even with the best available data because if there is wide deployment 
we can expect that the attributes of appliances and in-building communications and 
control technologies will change over time to take advantage of the opportunities that 
smart meters make possible to use electricity more wisely in response to more efficient 
price signals.  Thus, it is effectively impossible to measure long run demand elasticities 
taking the current attributes of appliances and equipment as given. 
 On the supply side, there are questions about how much all of this wizzy smart 
grid technology will cost and how these costs compare to the benefits that will be 
achieved.  The timing of investments on the supply side and responses on the demand 
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side can play an important role in this cost-benefit analysis and may have implications for 
the optimal roll-out of these technologies.  And measuring the costs is not easy.  There 
are many different vendors of smart meters and different vendors sell meters with 
different functionalities and different communications methods.   
 Moreover, the cost of buying and installing the meters is only part of the relevant 
cost.  Communications systems must be built, a new IT infrastructure for data acquisition, 
analysis and billing created and installed, customer service personnel retrained to respond 
to questions about more complex rate structures, and complementary distribution system 
upgrades are required to take advantage of the information and functionality provided by 
smart meters.  Smart meters should also save operating costs (especially for systems that 
have not already installed AMR meters): meter reading costs should be largely 
eliminated; visits to customer premises to cut them off because they have not paid their 
bills or a final reading is required when the residents change; unnecessary scheduling of 
crews to investigate outages which are on the customer rather than network side of the 
meter should be eliminated.  Better and faster information about customer outages may 
speed scheduling of repairs and reduce outage times.  However, aside from the savings in 
meter reading costs, the other potential savings from smart meters are either speculative, 
small or more appropriately assigned to the automation of the distribution network rather 
than to the smart meter per se.   
 One of the few “smart grid” areas where we have quite a bit of real empirical 
information and some serious analysis rather than speculation is with regard to various 
measures of the price responses of consumers faced with higher peak period prices in 
experimental pilot programs, and to a much lesser extent good estimates of demand 
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elasticities and cross-elasticities associated with a variety of approaches to variable 
demand pricing.  A large number of U.S. utilities began either piloting or offering as 
options variable pricing system for large C&I customers during the 1980s. See, for 
example Barbose et. al. (2005).  More recently, a number of states have introduced pilot 
programs for residential (household) consumers to examine the effects on demand by 
installing smart meters of various kinds and charging customers prices that vary with 
demand on the system and associated wholesale prices.  These pilots generally include 
experimental design features, individual consumption data collection, and empirical 
analyses to evaluate the effects of variable pricing treatments on consumer behavior.  
 Taylor, Schwarz, and Cochell (2005) estimates hourly own and cross price 
elasticities for industrial customers with up to eight years of experience on Duke Power’s 
optional real-time rates and find large net benefits from real time pricing for large 
industrial customers.  Faruqui and Sergici (2010) summarize the results of 15 earlier 
studies of various forms of dynamic pricing, from TOU pricing, to critical peak pricing, 
to real time pricing, (3 outside the U.S. and not all for households). Faruqui and Sergici 
(2011) analyze the results of a dynamic pricing study performed by Baltimore Gas & 
Electric using treatment and control groups drawn from a representative group of 
households.  Wolak (2006) analyzes a critical peak pricing experiment in Anaheim 
California and finds that consumers respond to high prices by reducing demand compared 
to a control group. Wolak 2010 analyzes and pilot program using critical peak pricing in 
Washington, D.C. He finds that customers on all of the dynamic pricing options respond 
with large reguctions in peak demand during high price periods. Alcott (2010) analyzes 
data from the Chicago Energy Smart Pricing Plan that began operating in 2003. The data 
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that he examines are drawn from a randomized experimental framework where prices 
could go as high as the equivalent of a wholesale price of 10 cents/kWh on “High Alert” 
days,” including estimates of demand elasticities and consumer surplus (this is not very 
high compared to the highest spot prices in the wholesale market).  However, Alcott’s 
study concludes that there is a gain in consumer surplus of only about $10 per year from 
the installation of smart meters combined with higher peak period prices in the 
experiment that he analyzes and notes that these benefits do not substantially outweigh 
the costs of the meters (which he puts at $150, at the very low range of smart meter 
installation cost numbers in the literature).  A number of these pilots include technology 
enhancements to facilitate customer responses, such as special bulbs that vary in color 
with price changes, thermostats that can be set to change temperatures during high price 
hours, and air conditioner control switches that can place air conditioners in a cycling 
mode during high price hours (e.g. on and off every 30 minutes).  Faruqui (2011) 
summarizes the reduction in peak load from 109 dynamic pricing pilots including TOU 
pilots, critical peak pricing pilots, and a few full real time pricing pilots and finds that 
higher peak period prices always lead to a reduction in peak demand.   
 A number of observations are worth making about the information and analysis 
that we have available so far about the effects of dynamic pricing on consumer behavior.  
First, there is wide variation in the design of the pilot/experimental studies and the 
variation in prices included in them.  Second, essentially all of these studies include only 
“volunteers” raising the possibility that the consumers in both the treatment and control 
groups are asymmetrically sensitive to prices.  Third, many of these pilots include a very 
small number of participants and in at least one study a large fraction of those who started 
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in the pilot dropped out before it was completed.  Fourth, most of the pilots do not really 
apply real time pricing.  Most of those for which we have data use either traditional TOU 
prices or “critical price period” designs where prices can be very high during a maximum 
number of hours each year and then follow more standard regulated pricing arrangements 
during other periods. These may be good approximations to full real time pricing, but this 
depends on how high the selected peak period prices are set and other factors.  For 
example, PG&E’s voluntary tariff for customers with smart meters starts with the regular 
tariff price except during “Smart High Price Periods,” which are communicated to the 
customer in advance by telephone, internet posting or text messaging, the price rises to 60 
cents per kWh between 2PM and 7PM for a maximum of 15 days per summer season.  
Fifth, several of the pilots apply only one price to the treatment group which makes it 
impossible to trace out the relevant demand functions without making very strong 
assumptions about the shape of the demand curves (i.e. randomized treatment and control 
groups is not enough.  There should also be several treatment groups but this requires a 
larger pilot than has often been the case (see Aigner 1985 regarding the need for multiple 
treatment groups). 
 Despite their deficiencies, the pilot programs and associated studies that have 
been conducted do lead to a number of conclusions: (a) consumers respond to higher 
peak prices by reducing peak demand; (b) dynamic pricing with very high prices during 
critical periods generally lead to much larger prices responses than traditional TOU 
pricing with pre-determined time periods and prices (and typically much small price 
differences); (c) wide variations in price responsiveness is observed, suggesting that the 
value of dynamic pricing will vary based on the attributes of the household and the 
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environment in which the household is located as well as the levels of prices; (d) most if 
not all of the price response to higher peak period prices is to reduce peak demand rather 
than to shift from peak to off-peak demand --- though this should not be too surprising 
given the importance of lighting, air conditioning, and refrigeration whose services are 
not easily stored using current technology, while the diffusion of plug-in vehicles or other 
technologies where time of use is a more important choice variable could yield very 
different results;14 (e) technologies and information that make it easier for consumers to 
respond to high price signals lead to larger responses to any given price increase; but (f) 
many of the reported results do not contain adequate information to estimate demand 
functions or to perform proper cost-benefit analyses. 
  Faruqui and Wood (2011), present a well thought out “template” for the most 
important items that should be included in a comprehensive cost benefit analysis and 
present simulations for four “prototype” utilities.  They conclude that in each case the 
benefits exceed the costs.  However, the simulations are not based on real utilities or a 
complete set of real numbers, but the hypothetical numbers are not unreasonable and the 
results are suggestive.  Of course, in the end, a proper cost-benefit analysis of universal 
deployment of smart meters may indicate that smart meters are net beneficial in the 
aggregate, but not beneficial to some significant number of individual customers.  Only 
Borenstein (2007b) takes the wide variation in customer utilization attributes seriously 
                                                 
14 We should not forget that when storage space heating was introduced in Europe during the 1960s it was 
consciously designed to shift demand to off-peak periods.  It did such a good job that the peak shifted from 
day to night in England and Northern Germany and the regulated prices no longer reflected the patterns of 
demand and cost.  Steiner (1956) and Kahn (1970) discuss this “shifting peak” case theoretically. More 
generally, we should be reminded that we should not take our eyes off of the long-run equilibrium which 
may look very different from the short run equilibrium especially with technological change.  
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and his focus is on larger C&I customers, not residential customers. This is an important 
issue and raises equity concerns that must be addressed.  
 There are clearly benefits from dynamic pricing.  But what are the costs of 
deployment?  Here I think that the numbers are much more speculative.  I have come 
across estimates of the cost of installing a smart meter for household use that vary from 
$120 to $500 per meter.  The source of the cost variations have not been explored in any 
detail but should be because they are large enough to affect rational deployment 
decisions.  Some of the variations reflect differences in metering technology, meter 
functionality, and what complementary investment costs are included with the cost of the 
meter itself.  For example, effective use of smart meters require investments in IT to 
acquire and process the data, investments in two way communications to utilize the 
meter, distribution network investments to make use of the functionalities available with 
some smart meters as their information and control capabilities can only be realized by 
investing in the automation of the local distribution network as well.   
Despite all of the excitement about smart meters, dynamic pricing, home 
communications, monitoring, and control devices, by the federal government and some 
states, there has also been a considerable amount of controversy surrounding smart meter 
programs in some states that have mandated the installation of smart meters for all 
customers.15 There are a number of concerns that have been raised.  First, the costs of 
                                                 
15Rebecca Smith,  “Smart Meter, Dumb Idea”,  The Wall Street Journal, page R5; Tux Turkel, “ CMP: 
Smart Meter Bills Come with Huge Costs,” The Portland Press Herald, April 5, 2011, 
http://www.pressherald.com/news/cmp-smart-meter-bills-come-with-huge-costs_2011-04-05.html; Tux 
Turkel, “PUC Allows “Smart Meter” Opt-outs,” The Portland Press Herald, May 18, 2011,  
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Fehrenbacher, “PG&E’s Smart Meter Report, A Case Study of Infrastructure Over Customer, May 12, 
2010, http://gigaom.com/cleantech/pges-smart-meter-report-a-case-study-of-infrastructure-over-customer/. 
David Baker, “Some PG&E Customers Want Choice on Smart Meters,” The San Francisco Chronicle, 
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new smart meters and complementary distribution network investments are recovered 
through the customers’ distribution charges on a cost of service basis. Customers who do 
not see sufficient benefits to justify any additional costs are unhappy.  On the other hand, 
for distribution systems that do not already have one-way automatic meter reading (AMR 
not AMI), the savings in meter reading costs alone can cover a large share of the costs of 
some smart meter devices.  In addition, customers with “unfavorable” consumption 
patterns may see higher bills rather than the lower bills they are being promised 
compared to the current flat rates which determine their bills (Borenstein 2007b).  
Second, some smart meters that have been installed have not worked properly and have 
led to faulty readings and other problems.  Third, smart meters that communicate with the 
distribution network and on to the control center using wireless technology have raised 
the usual health concerns, not dissimilar to health concerns raised for cell phones. Fourth, 
with all of the data that these meters can collect, rules for interoperability to allow 
different technologies to compete, and retail suppliers seeking to market services to help 
consumers to make use of the opportunities created by smart meters, privacy advocates 
have raised concerns about what data will be made widely available and how it may be 
used and protected.  Finally, some public utility commissions and some utilities have 
simply done a poor job educating their customers about smart meters and complementary 
grid investments and have rolled out their smart meter installation program too quickly. 
A universal rollout of these distribution grid automation and smart metering 
technologies will take several years.  There is a lot of uncertainty about costs and benefits 
and these costs and benefits vary across distribution feeders as well as customers.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
August 16, 2010, page D-1, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/16/BUPK1EUELD.DTL  
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rate and direction of future technological change on both sides of the meter is also 
uncertain.  Customer education has not kept up with the pace of thinking of some 
government and utility policymakers.  Finally, the existing distribution system is very old 
in many areas, equipment is failing and must be replaced.  Replacement programs should 
be consistent with longer term strategies for modernizing the distribution system. 
Accordingly, it seems to me that a sensible deployment strategy is to combine a long run 
rollout plan with a good set of well designed experiments (of course randomized trials 
with a robust set of treatments and the “rest of the distribution grid” as the control) to 
collect relevant data on demand response, meter and grid costs, reliability and power 
quality benefits, customer-side of the meter responses, etc., on a continuing basis from 
both treatment groups and control groups, to analyze those data, and to use the data to 
make mid-course corrections in the deployment strategy and to educate consumers.  The 
rush to judgment approach that commits to deploy a particular set of technologies as 
quickly as possible is in my view a mistake given the large investments contemplated and 
the diverse uncertainties that we now face.  
6. Conclusions 
 The technologies available to modernize the transmission and distribution 
networks in the U.S. and the enhanced opportunities to move to real time pricing of 
electricity so that retail prices better reflect the true marginal cost or market clearing 
wholesale price of generating electricity at different times create many potentially 
valuable opportunities to increase the efficiency of the U.S. electric power sector.  
Especially at a time when the transmission and distribution networks are aging and 
investments to replace key components will have to accelerate to maintain reliability, 
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these opportunities would be of interest even if new challenges created by policies 
promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency, and electric vehicles did not exist.   
 There are also many challenges that must be confronted to realize these policy 
goals and to do so at the lowest possible cost given the constraints on the policy 
instruments available.  Many of the challenges facing a natural evolution of a modern 
electric power system are institutional rather than technological or economic.  The 
industrial organization and jurisdictional splits in regulation of the electric power sector 
are simply poorly matched to the attributes of modern electric power networks.  While 
significant progress has been made in the last 25 years in restructuring the sector from 
one matched to the technologies and economics of the 1920s and 1930s to one better 
matched to the technologies, economics, and environmental challenges of the 21st 
century, the evolution has been slow and episodic. 
 Further work to measure the costs and benefits of the smart grid technologies also 
needs to be done and the quality and transparency of these analyses improved.  The 
structure of the electric power industry and the time it will take to deploy these 
technologies creates opportunities to do good controlled experiments that allow for more 
precise estimates of demand, cost savings, and increases in consumers plus producers 
surplus. While many such experiments are taking place their quality could be improved to 
get more precise results. Faruqui’s (2011b) report on the peak period price responses for 
109 pilot programs displays responses between 5% to 50% of peak demand even for 
pilots using critical peak pricing with enabling technologies.  An order of magnitude 
difference in measured price responses is just not good enough to do convincing cost-
benefit analyses, especially with the other experimental design issues noted above.  
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 Despite these reservations, I believe that the country is on a path to creating 
smarter transmission and distribution grids.  Exactly how far and how fast we go is still 
quite uncertain, especially as federal subsidies come to an end. 
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